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Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal Rules 
for Charities That Engage in Socially Responsible 





 Fiduciaries who invest assets held by a charity must act as prudent investors.  This 
Article examines the legal rules that apply to these fiduciaries, examining the duty of 
loyalty and the duty of prudent administration for trustees of charitable trusts and 
directors of nonprofit corporations.  The Article focuses on the duty to act as a prudent 
investor and the question of whether a charitable fiduciary can consider the charity’s 
mission or purpose when making investment decisions.  Recent developments in the laws 
that regulate investing by fiduciaries provide guidance, and the Article concludes that 
these rules permit consideration of a charity’s mission as one of many factors a prudent 
investor considers.  The Article briefly examines the history of socially responsible 
investing, reviews the development of mission investing, and discusses three types of 
socially responsible investing: screens, proxy voting, and community investing.  Recent 
data show improvements in the returns of screened funds and increased interest by 
charities in mission investing.  Fiduciaries must exercise care and judgment in making 
investment decisions, but mission investing can meet the legal standards that apply to 
fiduciaries as long as the fiduciaries act with prudence. 
INTRODUCTION: CHARITIES AND INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING 
¶1 Socially responsible investing by charities gained notoriety in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when colleges and universities faced pressure to divest holdings in South Africa to make 
an anti-apartheid statement.
1
  At that time, critics raised concerns about whether a 
                                               
 Orlando J. and Marian H. Hollis Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law.  B.A. 1977 Yale 
University; J.D. 1981 Columbia Law School.  This Article benefited from comments received at Socially 
Responsible Investing: Prudent or “Im”? the Annual Conference of the National Center on Philanthropy 
and the Law at New York University School of Law in May 2008.  The author would like to thank, in 
particular, Harvey P. Dale, Joel C. Dobris; Harvey J. Goldschmidt; John H. Langbein; and John G. Simon.  
In addition, the author would like to thank Grady Goodall for valuable research assistance and thoughtful 
discussion of the issues in this Article. 
1 Joel C. Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of “South African” Securities, 65 NEB. L. 
REV. 209 (1986); see John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 
MICH. L. REV. 72, 72 (1980).  Socially responsible investing, or ethical investing, can trace its roots to the 
anti-slavery efforts of Quakers in the 18th century.  Benjamin J. Richardson, Putting Ethics into 
Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical Investment, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 245 (2008), 
available at  http://ohlj.ca/english/documents/OHLJ46-
2_Richardson_PuttingEthicsintoEnvironmentalLaw.pdf.   
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university or other fiduciary could legally engage in socially responsible investing.
2
  
Discussions at Yale University led to the development of criteria for the exercise of 
investment responsibility by a university, with a focus on self-regulation to avoid 
participation in social injury through investments.
3
  Since the 1970s, investment 
companies have developed socially responsible funds for private investors.
4
  Charities 
continue to ponder what factors to consider in making investment decisions and whether 
socially responsible investing should play a role.  
¶2 Statutory laws on prudent investing—the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA)5 
and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA)
6—provide 
guidance on investment decision-making by charities, supplementing common law.  
UPIA applies to charities organized as trusts, and UPMIFA applies primarily to charities 
organized as nonprofit corporations.
7
  The rules in the two uniform Acts on investment 
decision-making are almost identical because UPMIFA drew its language from UPIA.
8
 
¶3 This Article will identify several types of investment decision-making that bring 
into consideration factors beyond the typical risk and return analysis that investors use to 
make decisions.  This Article will analyze the law that applies to investment decision-
making by charities, and conclude that consideration of the charity‘s mission as a factor 
is both appropriate and legal.  The Article does not suggest that investing for mission 
should undercut the prudent investor rule.  Rather, the Article explains that fiduciaries 
managing a charity must make investment decisions that consider the factors that a 
prudent investor should consider and argues that the charity‘s mission may be an 
appropriate factor to consider as part of that process. 
                                               
2 See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 76. 
3 See JOHN G. SIMON, CHARLES W. POWERS & JON P. GUNNEMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR/ UNIVERSITIES 
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY vii (1972), available at http://acir.yale.edu/pdf/EthicalInvestor.pdf.  
During 1968 and 1969, administrators, trustees, faculty, and students at Yale engaged in a series of 
meetings to discuss whether universities should consider ―the social consequences of corporate activities 
from which these institutions derive an endowment return.‖  Id.  As an outgrowth of those discussions, in 
the 1969–70 academic year, an interdisciplinary seminar considered questions related to socially 
responsible investing.  Id.  The professors who led the seminar produced a book, informed by the 
discussions in the seminar, which outlined criteria for the exercise of investment responsibility by a 
university.  Id. at ix.  The criteria are narrow and focus on self-regulation by universities ―to avoid 
participation in social injury‖ through investments.  Id. at 14. 
4 See, e.g., CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com; DOMINI SOC. INVESTMENTS,  
http://www.domini.com; PAX World Mutual Funds, PAX WORLD INVESTMENTS,  
http://www.paxworld.com/funds/pax-world-mutual-funds. 
5 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994). 
6 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006). 
7 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT prefatory note; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT 
§ 2(4)(5).  UPMIFA applies to entities of all sorts that hold funds exclusively for charitable purposes but 
excludes trusts unless a charity is the trustee of the trust.  Id. 
8 See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3 cmt.  UPMIFA does not incorporate a duty 
of loyalty directly and refers to other law–either trust law or nonprofit corporation law–for that rule.  Id. at 
§ 3(b). 
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I. INVESTING TO SERVE A CHARITABLE PURPOSE
9
 
¶4 This Article uses three terms to describe three different types of investment assets 
or investment strategies: program-related assets, socially responsible investing, and 
mission investing.  The Article draws a distinction between the terms ―socially 
responsible investing‖ and ―mission investing‖ that may not be widely used.10  The 
Article employs this distinction to clarify issues faced by charitable fiduciaries when the 
fiduciaries make investment decisions.  Beyond this Article, however, the term ―socially 
responsible investing,‖ or ―SRI,‖ is commonly used to encompass the type of investing 
the Article terms ―mission investing.‖11 
A. Program-Related Assets 
¶5 A charity may hold program-related assets to carry out its programs.  A university 
needs classrooms, science laboratories, and dormitories.  A soup kitchen may own a 
building with a kitchen, dining room, food storage room, and office space.  An animal 
shelter will need a building and some amount of land to house and exercise the animals.  
All of these assets have some financial value, but the charities hold the assets for their 
functional value.  A piece of land or a building may increase in value, and in rare cases, 
could be a source of financial gain for the charity, but a charity will not make a decision 
to purchase an asset of this sort with investment return as the primary consideration.  The 
possibility of investment return may be a factor in deciding which building to buy, but the 




¶6 UPMIFA defines a program-related asset as ―an asset held by an institution 
primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution and not primarily for 
investment.‖13  UPMIFA excludes program-related assets from its requirement that a 
charity invest funds prudently.
14
  As the comments to UPMIFA point out, however, even 
                                               
9 This Article uses the term ―charitable‖ in its traditional, trust law sense and therefore includes purposes 
such as educational purposes.  The Uniform Trust Code defines ―charitable purpose‖ as ―the relief of 
poverty, the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal 
purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.‖  UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§ 405(a) (2005).  UPMIFA adopts the same definition.  UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS 
ACT § 2(1).  As the comment to this subsection in UPMIFA explains, the ―standard derives from the 
English Statute of Charitable Uses, enacted in 1601.‖  Id. at § 2(1) cmt.  This Article uses the term 
―charity‖ to refer to an organization created for charitable purposes, whether organized as a charitable trust 
or as a nonprofit corporation.  
10 See SARAH COOCH & MARK KRAMER, COMPOUNDING IMPACT: MISSION INVESTING BY U.S. 
FOUNDATIONS 10 (2007) (discussing terminology and the inconsistency that exists in the way the terms are 
used).  The Cooch and Kramer study uses the term ―mission investing‖ in the way this Article uses the 
term.  The study notes that ―mission-related investing‖ is also used but sometimes is limited to market-rate 
investments or investments made by endowments.  Id. 
11 See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, SRI—Shibboleth or Canard (Socially Responsible Investing, That Is), 42 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 755, 757 (2008) (noting among five reasons that people engage in SRI are that 
people want investments to ―match the mission‖). 
12 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(7). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. § 2(5).  The Drafting Committee considered making UPMIFA applicable to all assets held by a 
charity, and if the Act had applied to all assets held by a charity, the usefulness of a program-related asset 
would have been a factor to consider in determining the prudence of the investment.  See Memorandum 
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assets used ―primarily‖ for a charitable purpose may also serve an investment purpose.15  
Although UPMIFA does not apply to those assets, the duty of prudence that applies to all 
decision-making by a charity‘s fiduciaries requires the charity to examine the investment 
component of the asset and use that information to inform decision-making with respect 
to that asset.
16
  The charity should consider the cost of the asset, as well as the possibility 
of an investment return in the future.
17
  
¶7 UPIA does not exclude program-related investments and therefore impliedly 
includes them, so any asset held by a charitable trust will be subject to the investment 
standard of UPIA.  UPIA directs the trustee to consider the purposes of the trust
18
 and 
also directs the trustee to consider the special value of an asset to the trust‘s purposes,19 
so a trustee of a charitable trust can invest in a program-related asset within the 
constraints of UPIA.  However, the trustee should consider the economic factors of the 
investment, just as directors of a nonprofit corporation making a decision about a 




¶8 The Internal Revenue Code uses the term ―program-related investment‖ to exclude 
certain assets from § 4944, the provision that imposes a penalty on a private foundation 
that invests in an asset that would ―jeopardize the carrying out of its exempt purposes.‖21  
Section 4944 defines a program-related investment as one ―the primary purpose of which 
is to accomplish one or more of the [charity‘s exempt purposes] . . . and no significant 
purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation of property.‖22  The 
§ 4944 definition is somewhat different from the UPMIFA definition,
23
 but the difference 
is not relevant for purposes of this Article.  Both definitions apply to assets a charity 
owns primarily for program purposes and not to assets owned primarily for investment 
purposes.  This Article focuses on assets which serve primarily as financial investments 
but which also serve some program purposes.  
                                                                                                                                            
from Susan Gary, Reporter, UMIFA Drafting Comm. to UMIFA Drafting Comm. (Oct. 20, 2003), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/umoifa/memo1003.htm [hereinafter UMIFA 
Drafting Comm. Memo].  The appeal of having the prudent investor rules of UPMIFA apply to all assets 
would have been that some assets have mixed purposes, both investment and program.  See id.  After 
consideration, the Drafting Committee decided that treating assets that serve only incidental investment 
purposes as ―investments‖ did not make sense.  See id.  The university classrooms, the dining room for the 
soup kitchen, and the kennels for the animal shelter do not serve investment purposes in the usual sense, 
and seemed out of place in a statute that provides rules on prudent investment.  See id. 
15 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(7) cmt. (noting that a program providing loans 
to inner-city businesses may serve both a charitable and an investment purpose). 
16 See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1988). 
17 See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(7) cmt.  
18 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994). 
19 Id. § 2(c)(8). 
20 REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30. 
21 I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006).  See infra text accompanying notes 166–74. 
22 § 4944(c). 
23 The UPMIFA drafting committee changed ―significant purpose‖ to ―primarily for investment‖ in an 
attempt to make it more difficult for a charity to disguise a failed investment as a program-related 
investment.  See UMIFA Drafting Comm. Memo, supra note 14.  
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B. Socially Responsible Investing 
¶9 In general, the idea behind socially responsible investing is that investment 
decision makers should consider social or ethical issues as well as financial ones in 
making decisions about investments.
24
  Advocates argue that investments can, and 
should, effect positive social change as well as generate financial returns.
25
  Socially 
responsible investing, also called social investing, gained adherents in the 1970s.
26
  At 
that time, pension funds and universities, in particular, faced growing pressure to engage 
in socially responsible investing.
27
  In particular, concerns over apartheid in South Africa 
led to calls for universities to divest from companies that engaged in business there;
28
 
pension funds of state employees were pushed to invest in businesses located in the 
state;
29
 and union pension plans began to invest in ―socially desirable projects.‖30  The 
concept also gained critics who raised concerns about whether socially responsible 
investing by fiduciaries violated the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
31
 
¶10 Socially responsible investing has developed in breadth and depth since the 
1970s.
32
  Socially responsible funds created in the 1970s and 1980s either screened out 
                                               
24 Maria O‘Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an 
Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1, nn.2–3 (1993) (citing several attempts at defining socially 
responsible investing).  In their 1980 critique of socially responsible investing, John Langbein and Richard 
Posner defined the term to mean ―excluding the securities of certain otherwise attractive companies from an 
investor‘s portfolio because the companies are judged to be socially irresponsible, and including the 
securities of certain otherwise unattractive companies because they are judged to be behaving in a socially 
laudable way.‖  Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 73.  They explained that they used ―attractive‖ and 
―unattractive‖ to ―refer to the conventional objective of investment, which is to make money.‖  Id.  In 
contrast, a recent study explains that ―[s]ocially responsible investing (SRI) is an investment process that 
considers the social and environmental consequences of investments, both positive and negative, within the 
context of rigorous financial analysis.‖  SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006), available at  
http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/research/Trends/2005%20Trends%20Report.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS]. 
25 Maria Markham Thompson, Socially Responsible Investing Has Become a Mainstream Practice, 50 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. B24 (2004), available at http://chronicle.com/article/Socially-Responsible-
Investing/36437/. 
26 Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 72 (citing EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SHOULD 
PENSION ASSETS BE MANAGED FOR SOCIAL/POLITICAL PURPOSES? (Dallas L. Salisbury ed. 1980)) 
(considering social investing by pension funds and university endowment funds); ANNE SIMPSON, THE 
GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: HOW THE ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND POLITICS ARE RESHAPING 
STRATEGIES 27 (1991) (summarizing the history of ethical investment in the U.S. dating back to 1928 when 
religious organizations began to engage in social investing). 
27 See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 72–73. 
28 Hylton, supra note 24, at 3 (describing South African apartheid as the issue that attracted the attention of 
―virtually every socially responsible fund‖). 
29 See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 72. 
30 See, e.g., id. at 72 (describing a United Auto Workers‘ labor contract that applied a social investing 
requirement to ―up to ten percent of new pension contributions‖).  
31 See id. at 96 (arguing ―that social investing is contrary to trust law‖). 
32 See TRENDS, supra note 24, at 1–2 (tracking growth in socially responsible investments from $40 billion 
in 1984 to $2.29 trillion in 2005); Lewis D. Solomon & Karen C. Coe, Social Investments by Nonprofit 
Corporations and Charitable Trusts: A Legal and Business Primer for Foundation Managers and Other 
Nonprofit Fiduciaries, 66 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 213, 213 (1997); Thompson, supra note 25; see also, Cooch & 
Kramer, supra note 10, at 14–26 (providing data on trends in mission investing); SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
FORUM, 2007 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii 
(2007), available at http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/pubs/ (follow ―2007 Report on Socially 
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companies with poor social or environmental records
33
 or focused on a particular issue, 
like apartheid.
34
  In recent years, funds have continued to develop exclusionary screens,
35
 
and in addition, funds now employ inclusionary screens that look for companies with 
good corporate performance on a variety of social and environmental issues.
36
  Socially 
responsible investors may also evaluate corporate governance and use shareholder 
advocacy and community investment as strategies.
37
 
¶11 Diversification has become easier because socially responsible funds are now 
available across a broad range of share classes and in different investment styles.
38
  
Socially responsible investing now provides a variety of choices, and allows investors to 
focus on issues of particular concern to them.  For charities, the development of choices, 
both in terms of investment options and in terms of types of issues addressed by the 
funds, has meant that a charity can more easily make carrying out its mission a factor in 
making decisions about investments. 
C. Mission Investing 
¶12 ―Mission investing,‖ as this Article uses the term, means something different from 
socially responsible investing.  Mission investing means that a charity uses some of its 
investment assets, as distinguished from its program-related assets, in ways that 
accomplish its investment objectives while also supporting its charitable mission.
39
  The 
charity considers its mission as a factor in making investment decisions, and does not 
                                                                                                                                            
Responsible Investing Trends in the United States Executive Summary‖ hyperlink; then fill out request 
form; then document will be emailed to you) [hereinafter TRENDS (2007)] (―From 2005–2007 alone SRI 
assets increased more than 18 percent while the broader universe of professionally managed assets 
increased less than 3 percent.‖).  The Responsible Endowments Coalition, created in 2004, has brought 
together students, alumni, and faculty from thirty-five universities and colleges.  RESPONSIBLE 
ENDOWMENTS COALITION, http://www.endowmentethics.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (―Responsible 
investment . . . can support environmental progress and social justice all while making great financial 
returns.‖).  In 2008, Cambridge Associates, an investment consulting firm for foundations and 
endowments, announced its launch of a mission investing division.  See MARK KRAMER & ANNE STETSON, 
A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE LAW OF MISSION INVESTING FOR U.S. FOUNDATIONS 5 (2008).  Three foundations, 
the Heron Foundation, Meyer Memorial Trust, and the Annie E. Casey Foundation, supported the 
development of this division.  Id. 
33 TRENDS, supra note 24, at 4. 
34 Id. 
35
 Id. at 7–8, Figure 2.5 (identifying the five most common social screens: tobacco, alcohol, gambling, 
defense/weapons, community relations).  See Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialog, 30 U. PA. 
J. INT‘L L. 823 (2009), for an interesting discussion of recent divestment efforts focused on Sudan, 
including a description of the work of the Sudan Divestment Task Force. 
36 See TRENDS, supra note 24, at 3 (―Generally, social investors seek to own profitable companies that 
make positive contributions to society.‖).  The Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation lists inclusionary screens 
that direct managers to identify companies with an environmental commitment and a commitment to 
reduce adverse environmental impacts, companies that support sustainable agriculture, companies that 
facilitate pay equity, and companies whose labor practices and compensation standards support collective 
bargaining, living wage, and pay equity.  Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation Investment Policy, JESSIE SMITH 
NOYES FOUNDATION, http://www.noyes.org/taxonomy/term/10 [hereinafter Noyes Investment Policy]. 
37 See TRENDS, supra note 24, at 16–27. 
38 See id. at 7 (reporting at least 201 screened funds and more than 370 share classes).  The 2007 survey 
reported 260 screened funds.  TRENDS (2007), supra note 32, at ii. 
39 Dobris, supra note 11, at 768 (describing mission investing as ―making fuzzy the formerly clear 
boundary between investing for gain and granting for charitable purposes‖). 
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ignore the other factors a prudent investor should consider.  Mission investing assumes 
that when an investment decision maker considers the best interests of a charity, the 
decision maker can use the charity‘s mission as a factor, while also analyzing the 
potential financial gain from an investment.  The investment may either yield an 
investment return similar to investments made without consideration of mission, or the 
mission-related benefits may outweigh any reduced financial benefits.  If the charity 
decides to accept somewhat lower financial returns in order to obtain mission-related 




II. LEGAL RULES APPLICABLE TO INVESTING BY CHARITIES 
A. Fiduciary Duties 
¶13 Trust law has developed strict fiduciary rules to protect the interests of beneficiaries 
who have beneficial but not legal title to the property held in trust.
41
  A fiduciary holds 
legal but not beneficial title to assets and may be tempted to try to benefit personally from 
the position of legal control.
42
  Fiduciary duties also apply in corporate law, where 
shareholders own beneficial interests and the directors manage the business.  For 
charities, the fiduciary duties carry particular importance because the ―beneficiary‖ may 
be a charitable purpose or an indefinite number of unidentified beneficiaries and not an 
identifiable person.
43
  Oversight of charitable management is limited,
44
 so the legal rules 
are of particular importance.  Whether a charity is organized as a charitable trust or as a 
nonprofit corporation, the rules provide guidance to persons managing charities. 
                                               
40 A determination of the financial ―cost‖ of a mission investment will be difficult.  Empirical work 
examining the period 1992–2007 found that investments in companies that scored high on social 
responsibility factors such as community, employee relations and the environment had a performance 
advantage related to investments based on conventional investment strategies.  See MEIR STATMAN & 
DENYS GLUSHKOV, THE WAGES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM 21 (2008), 
available at http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/research/documents/2008WinningPrize-Moskowitz.pdf.  
Investments in companies associated with tobacco, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, or nuclear 
operations, left investors at a return disadvantage.  Id. 
41 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 640–43 (1995) 
(―The trust relationship of necessity puts the beneficiaries of a trust at the peril of the trustees‘ misbehavior 
—for example, if the trustees should misappropriate or mismanage the trust‘s assets.  The central concern 
of modern trust law is to safeguard against those dangers.‖).   
42 See also GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 342 (6th ed. 1987).  In a discussion of the duty of loyalty, Bogert‘s 
treatise on Trusts says: ―It is a well-known quality of human nature that it is extremely difficult, or perhaps 
impossible, for an individual to act fairly in the interests of others whom he represents and at the same time 
to consider his own financial advantage.‖  Id. at 342. 
43 This Article discusses investments by fiduciaries of charities and not other fiduciaries, for example those 
managing pensions.  The analysis of socially responsible investing by pension managers must address the 
fact that a pension plan has identifiable beneficiaries.  A charity does not, which means consideration of the 
interests of the beneficiaries can, and should, consider mission rather than individual people. 
44 Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law and Tax Law, 21 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 593, 609 (2000). 
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B. Duty of Loyalty 
1. Meaning of the Duty of Loyalty 
¶14 The duty of loyalty applies to the trustees and directors who manage a charity.  In 
trust law, the duty of loyalty is the trustee‘s duty to act ―solely in the interests of the 
beneficiaries.‖45  The trustee must put the trustee‘s duties to the trust first and cannot act 
for personal benefit.  If a trustee interacts with the trust on the trustee‘s own account, for 
the trustee‘s personal interests, such self-dealing can constitute a breach of the duty of 
loyalty.
46
  Under trust law, a beneficiary can void a self-dealing transaction unless the 
trust document authorized the transaction; a court approved the transaction; the statute of 
limitations has run; the beneficiary consented to or ratified the transaction; the 




¶15 Nonprofit corporation statutes apply the duty of loyalty to charities organized as 
nonprofit corporations.  A nonprofit director must act ―in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.‖48  A conflict of interest 
transaction is voidable unless the transaction was fair at the time it was entered into; was 
approved by the board of directors acting in good faith and with a reasonable belief that 
the transaction was fair to the charity, after disclosure to the board of the material facts 




¶16 In both trust law and nonprofit corporation law, the duty of loyalty is structured to 
prevent a fiduciary from taking advantage of the trust for personal gain.  Thus, the focus 
of the duty of loyalty under both trust and nonprofit corporate law has been on self-
dealing by the trustee.  
2. Application to Investment Decision-Making 
¶17 Clearly, a fiduciary should not make an investment decision for the charity based 
on private benefit to the fiduciary.
50
  Even if the fiduciary does not benefit personally, 
however, a comment to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that the duty of loyalty 
treats as improper a trustee‘s decision to invest in a manner that benefits a third party or a 
non-trust objective.
51
  The beneficiaries‘ interests must come first, but then the question 
                                               
45 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2005); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (2007) (―[A] trustee 
has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.‖).  John Langbein has argued 
that a ―best interests‖ standard would better serve trust beneficiaries.  John H. Langbein, Questioning the 
Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest? 114 YALE L. J. 929, 980–86 (2005).  The duty of 
loyalty developed in the common law of trusts, long before the Uniform Trust Code codified the duty.  See 
BOGERT, supra note 42, at § 95, 341–47. 
46 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b). 
47Id. § 802(b)(1)–(5).  A self-dealing transaction is not automatically void but instead is voidable by a 
beneficiary.  Even if no exception is met, a beneficiary can choose not to void a self–dealing transaction.  
Id. 
48 REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1988). 
49 Id. § 8.31(a)–(b). 
50 Beneficiaries can consent to transactions that would otherwise be self-dealing, but the transaction must 
be in the sole or best interests of the beneficiaries.  See supra text accompanying notes 45–47. 
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. f (2007). 
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becomes how one views the ―sole interests‖ or ―best interests‖ of the beneficiaries.  
Traditionally, the view has been that the trustee‘s duty relates only to the beneficiaries‘ 
financial interests.
52
  Yet nothing in the duty of loyalty requires the trustee to exclude 
consideration of a beneficiary‘s non-financial interests.   
¶18 The view of what constitutes the sole interests or best interests appears to be 
changing.
53
  With respect to private investors, commentators have questioned whether the 
investors‘ sole interests lie in maximizing returns without regard to the types of 
investments the trust makes.
54
  Meir Statman, a professor of finance at Santa Clara 
University who studies investor behavior, comments that investment advice that ignores 
beneficiaries‘ non-monetary interests is ―fundamentally flawed.‖55  He notes that 
financial advisors regularly tell investors with concerns about environmental degradation 
to invest in companies that pollute and then use the investment returns to fund charities 
that fight pollution.
56
  Statman views this kind of advice as irrational.  Statman discusses 
private investors, but his analysis of the interests of private individuals is instructive with 
respect to the interests of trust beneficiaries.  At issue for a trustee is determining the 
interests of the beneficiaries, and Statman suggests that if one asks private individuals 
about preferences for investing assets, their interests may well include non-monetary 
interests.
57
   
¶19 Turning to charities, determining the sole interests or best interests of a charitable 
purpose or even specific charitable entities becomes more complicated than considering 
the interests of private beneficiaries.  A charity wants to maximize income within its risk 
tolerance and use the income for its charitable purposes.  The charity may also want to 
use its investments to support its charitable mission.  How does the duty of loyalty apply 
to mission investing or socially responsible investing by charities?  
¶20 A fiduciary‘s own views of socially responsible investing may conflict with the 
charitable purposes of the charity.  If a fiduciary decides to invest in a particular asset 
because doing so will be ―best for the world‖ in some general way, or because the 
investment will support a cause the fiduciary favors, then making the investment decision 
on those grounds could be a breach of the duty of loyalty.  If the investment does well 
                                               
52 Many scholars writing about the duty of loyalty have assumed that a beneficiary‘s interests in a trust are 
only financial interests.  See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 96 (―[A] trustee who sacrifices the 
beneficiary‘s financial well-being for any other object breaches both his duty of loyalty to the beneficiary 
and his duty of prudence in investment.‖). 
53 Joel Dobris has recently stated that the duty of loyalty may encompass non-monetary interests.  He 
writes, with respect to private trusts:  
If a fiduciary invests in SRI at a cost in risk or return to please himself, that is a breach of 
the duty of loyalty.  If he does it to please some of the beneficiaries and there is a 
financial cost, he‘s breaching his duty of impartiality (to the non-SRI beneficiaries) and 
his duty to invest competently. If truly all of the beneficiaries want SRI investing, they 
can set aside any relevant duties, or it could be claimed they were in the receipt of 
psychic income. 
Dobris, supra note 11, at n. 27. 
54 See id. 
55 See Meir Statman, Why You’re Not a Rational Investor, FORTUNE MAG., Nov. 7, 2007, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/11/12/101008311/index.htm.  
56 See id. 
57 Id.  (quoting an investor as saying ―I consider it a luxury that I now have the ability to invest more in line 
with my values‖). 
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financially, no one is likely to complain, but even so, a fiduciary who invests for reasons 
unrelated to the charity has not acted in the sole interests of the charity.  
¶21 If, instead, the fiduciary uses the interests of the charity to inform investment 
decision-making, doing so may be within the scope of the duty of loyalty.  The fiduciary 
must act for the sole interests or best interests of the charity, and those interests may 
include non-monetary interests.  Thus, mission investing is consistent with the duty of 
loyalty.  Although no court has adopted this analysis, revisions to comments to the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts suggest that the law, or at least legal thinking, is headed 
toward this understanding of how the duty of loyalty applies to investing by charities.
58
 
¶22 In a critique of 1970s social investing, Professors Langbein and Posner pointed out 
that a trustee owes a duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiaries to carry out the purposes of 
the trust.
59
  The broad approach to social investing taken at the time—the idea of 
investing in socially desirable projects that have general social utility but no particular 
connection to the mission of the trust—meant that trustees who engaged in social 
investing were not concerned solely with the interests of the beneficiaries.
60
  Langbein 
and Posner concluded that the duty of loyalty forbids social investing ―in its current 
form.‖61  They explained that the social principles embodied in the idea of social 
investing were ―poorly specified‖62 and that the criteria used to identify ―socially 
irresponsible companies‖ were ―dubious.‖63  At that time, issues involved in deciding 
which investments were socially responsible may have been unrelated to the purpose of 
the charity.
64
  Langbein and Posner noted that social investing could confer a non-
economic value on the trust beneficiary that might compensate for any loss of economic 
value in the investment.
65
  Given the type of social investing engaged in at the time, 
however, Langbein and Posner concluded that the non-economic value did not directly 
benefit the beneficiaries of the trust.
66
  
¶23 Concurring with these arguments against social investing, the comment to the 
UPIA‘s section on the duty of loyalty includes a strongly worded statement against 
socially responsible investing: 
No form of so-called ‗social investing‘ is consistent with the duty of 
loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrificing the interests of trust 
beneficiaries—for example, by accepting below-market returns—in favor 
                                               
58 See discussion infra Part C.  The duty of loyalty provision in the 1992 version of Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts did not include a reference to social investing.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1992).  
Neither did the prudent investor rule.  Id. § 227.  
59 Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 96–97 (explaining that a trustee breaches the duty of loyalty owed to 
the trust if someone other than the beneficiary benefits at the expense of the beneficiary). 
60 See id. at 96–97. 
61 Id. at 110–11.  
62 Id. at 83 (―[T]here is no consensus about which social principles to pursue and about which investments 
are consistent or inconsistent with those principles.‖). 
63 Id. at 84. 
64 See SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 156–60 (identifying as a rationale for a university 
to engage in socially responsible investing the need to ―foster a climate conducive to education.‖). 
65 Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 94. 
66 Id. at 95.  Much of the Langbein and Posner article focuses on investing by trustees of private trusts and 
pension funds and then applies its analysis to charitable trusts.  Id. at 110–11. 
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The comment does not discuss mission investing and ignores the argument that investing 
for a social purpose could be consistent with the interests of beneficiaries.
68
  
¶24 In 2007, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts added language from the UPIA to the 
Restatement‘s commentary on its section on the duty of loyalty.69  The Restatement 
comment notes that ―[n]ot surprisingly, considerable disagreement continues about what 
loyalty should require in this context.‖70  The comment then cites articles addressing the 
issue in the context of pension plans and does not discuss investing by charities.
71
  
Although this Restatement comment does not directly address investing by charities, it 
does include a reference to the Restatement section on prudent investment.
72
  The 
comment on prudent investment draws a distinction between socially responsible 




¶25 The Restatement‘s section on prudent investment includes the requirement that the 
trustee must conform to the duty of loyalty.
74
  The comment to that section explains that 
the trustee cannot invest trust assets to promote the trustee‘s personal views on social or 
political causes.
75
  The comment notes that the terms of the trust may permit investing 
based on social or political issues
76
 and that beneficiaries may consent to such 
investing.
77
  Next, the comment turns to investing by charities:  
[S]ocial considerations may be taken into account in investing the funds of 
charitable trusts to the extent the charitable purposes would justify an 
expenditure of trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or to the 
                                               
67 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 cmt. (1994).  Professor Langbein served as Reporter for UPIA and as 
Reporter wrote the comments. 
68 See id.  ―Commentators supporting social investing tend to concede the overriding force of the duty of 
loyalty.  They argue instead that particular schemes of social investing may not result in below-market 
returns.‖  Id.   
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. f (2007). 
70 Id. 
71 See id.  The comment cites to two articles addressing the issue in the context of pension plans.  Id.  
Pension plans have identifiable beneficiaries and are beyond the scope of this Article. 
72 Id. 
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (2007).  (―[S]ocial considerations may be taken into 
account in investing the funds of charitable trusts to the extent the charitable purposes would justify an 
expenditure of trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or to the extent the investment decision 
can be justified on grounds of advancing, financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the 
trust.‖). 
74 Id. § 90(c)(1). 
75 Id. § 90 cmt. c. 
76 Id.  A trust agreement can always permit a trustee to invest in a way that would otherwise constitute self-
dealing.  For example, a settlor anticipating the importance of non-financial considerations may relieve the 
trustee of potential liability for dealing with shares in a family business in which the trustee also owns 
shares.  A settlor could also direct the trustee to consider social issues in investing.  
77 Id.  A beneficiary can consent to a self-dealing transaction by the trustee. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 
802(b)(4) (2005) (stating that a trustee‘s transaction with the trust property that is self-dealing is permitted 
if the beneficiary consented to or ratified the transaction, or released the trustee in compliance with § 1009). 
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extent the investment decision can be justified on grounds of advancing, 
financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust.
78
 
This comment may be the clearest legal articulation of the application of the duty of 
loyalty to mission investing.  The comment suggests that a trustee can consider the 
charitable purpose of a trust as a factor in making investment decisions.  Although the 
Restatement and this comment apply to charities organized as trusts, trust law has long 
served as a source of guidance for nonprofit corporations and seems a particularly 
appropriate source in this context.
79
 
C. Prudent Investor Standard 
1. Prudent Investor Act—Rules for Charitable Trusts 
¶26 Another fiduciary duty, the duty of prudent administration or the duty of care, 
applies more directly to investment decision-making by trustees.
80
  In general, a trustee 
must manage a trust as a prudent person would, exercising reasonable care, skill, and 
caution.
81
  The rules on investing trust assets lie within this duty of prudence.  As early as 
1830, the common law required a trustee to act with prudence when investing assets of a 
trust.
82
  The prudence standard evolved over time, reflecting changes in the application of 
the standard and changes in investing practices.
83
  As modern portfolio theory became 
more widely understood, the time came for a significant re-articulation of the standard.  
¶27 The American Law Institute revised provisions in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
that applied to investment decision-making by trustees, creating, in 1992, the prudent 
investor rule.
84
  The Uniform Law Commission built on the Restatement project and in 
1994 approved UPIA.  This uniform Act provides rules on investing by trustees
85




                                               
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (2007). 
79 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, prefatory note (1994) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: 
PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 379, cmt. b (1992)) (―[T]he duties of the members of the governing board of a 
charitable corporation are generally similar to the duties of the trustee of a charitable trust.‖). 
80 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (2007) (―(1) The trustee has a duty to administer the trust as 
a prudent person would, in light of the purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust. (2) The duty of 
prudence requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution.‖).  
81 See id. at § 77(2). 
82 See Harvard Coll. v. Armory, 26 Mass. 446, 471–73 (1830). 
83 John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
641, 643–46 (1996) (providing a history of prudent investing under trust law and the reasons for the 
changes to trust law). 
84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007) (―The trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries to invest 
and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the purposes, terms, distribution 
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.‖); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the 
Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1151 (1992). 
85 See Langbein, supra note 83, for a complete explanation of UPIA and a discussion of trust-investment 
law. 
86 Forty-four states have adopted UPIA.  A Few Facts About the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, NAT‘L 
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. L.,  
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upria.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter A Few Facts About UPIA].  Maryland is listed as ―substantially similar‖ and is counted in this 
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¶28 UPIA‘s investment rules direct trustees to invest and manage trust assets as a 
prudent investor would, exercising reasonable care, skill, and caution in doing so;
87
 to 
consider the entire portfolio in making investments and to allocate risk across the 
portfolio;
88
 and to diversify trust assets unless the purposes of the trust are better served 
by not diversifying.
89
  UPIA encourages trustees to delegate some investment 
responsibilities and provides a safe harbor for a trustee who exercises ―reasonable care, 




¶29 The standard of care in UPIA directs a trustee to consider a number of factors, 
some relating to economic conditions and some relating to the trust itself and the needs of 
the beneficiaries.  The trustee shall consider the ―purposes, terms, distribution 
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.‖91  Thus, for a charitable trust, its 
charitable purposes become factors to consider in making investment decisions.  In 
addition, the trustee shall consider, if relevant, ―an asset‘s special relationship or special 
value, if any, to the purposes of the trust.‖92  The comment to UPIA § 2 explains that this 
factor permits a trustee to take into account non-financial preferences of a beneficiary, 
such as sentimental attachment to heirlooms or other prized assets.
93
  For a charity, an 
asset may be related to the charitable purpose.
94
 
2. UMIFA and UPMIFA—Rules for Nonprofit Corporations 
¶30 In 1972, the Uniform Law Commission approved the Uniform Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA), an Act developed to provide legal guidance for 
charities organized as nonprofit corporations.
95
  At the time the Uniform Law 
Commission developed the Act a great deal of uncertainty existed concerning the 
fiduciary duties of directors of nonprofit corporations with respect to investment 
decision-making.
96
  UMIFA adopted rules that reflected changes in thinking about 
                                                                                                                                            
Article as one of the forty-four states in the list.  The District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands have 
also adopted UPIA.  Id.  See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust 
Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J. L. & ECON. 681 (2007), for a discussion of the 
effect of UPIA on investment decision-making. 
87
 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994). 
88 See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b). 
89 Id. at § 3. 
90 Id. at § 9.  See Langbein, supra note 83, at 650–52 (describing the traditional nondelegation rule and the 
importance for prudent investing of the changes wrought by UPIA); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 171 cmt. h (1959) (―A trustee cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments.‖). 
91 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a). 
92 Id. at § 2(c)(8). 
93 Id. at § 2 cmt. 
94 A program-related asset is one related to the charitable purpose of the trust.  See discussion supra Part 
I.A. 
95 Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2007). 
96 See id. at 1284–87 (describing the report prepared by William Cary and Craig Bright that highlighted the 
uncertainty because the law relating to charitable organizations was ―rudimentary and vague‖ and called for 
statutory reform). 
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investment decision-making: prudent decision-making that included diversification, a 
total return concept, and delegation.  Forty-eight jurisdictions adopted UMIFA.
97
 
¶31 The prudence standards of UMIFA provided useful guidance to directors of 
nonprofit corporations.  Thirty-five years later, the development of UPIA provided a 
catalyst for the decision to revise UMIFA.
98
  In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission 
approved a revised Act with a new name: the Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA).
99
  UPMIFA still applies to nonprofit corporations and 
not to trusts,
100
 but today the rules on investing are the same whether UPIA or UPMIFA 
applies. 
¶32 UPMIFA uses language from the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act to state 
the overall duty of care for prudent investing.
101
  Under UPMIFA, a charitable manager 
must act ―in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would exercise under similar circumstances.‖102  The Act then uses language from UPIA 
to provide more specific guidance for those managing and investing charitable funds.
103
  
UPMIFA directs the persons responsible for managing and investing the funds of an 
institution to act as a prudent investor would, directly mirroring the language from UPIA.  
UPMIFA includes the two factors noted above that direct the fiduciary to consider non-
financial aspects of an investment.  The Act directs the decision maker to consider ―the 
charitable purposes of the institution and the purposes of the institutional fund‖104 in 
managing and investing assets for the charity and adds that the fiduciary may consider, if 
relevant, ―an asset‘s special relationship or special value, if any, to the charitable purposes 
of the institution.‖105  
                                               
97 A Few Facts About the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. L., http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
umifa.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).  
98 See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT prefatory note (2006).  See Susan N. Gary, 
Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 
41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1280–88 (2007), for a detailed discussion of the history and adoption of UPMIFA.  
99 Press Release, Nat‘l Conference of Commissioners on Unif. State Laws, Major Overhaul of Rules 
Governing Charitable Institutions Approved, (July 13, 2006),  
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=163. 
100 UPMIFA, like UMIFA, applies to all charities, but the Acts do not apply to charitable funds managed in 
trust form unless a charity is the trustee.  The Acts do not cover charitable funds managed by corporate or 
individual trustees.  UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006) at §1(2)(i); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. 
OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §2(5)(B). 
101 MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1988) states:  
(a) A director shall discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties 
as a member of a committee:  
(1) in good faith;  
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise 
under similar circumstances; and  
(3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
102 UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(b). 
103 Id. § 3 cmt.  In 1992 the Prefatory Note to UPIA explained that the standards of UPIA ―can be expected 
to inform the investment responsibilities of directors and officers of charitable corporations.‖  Id.  Thus, 
UPMIFA clarified the meaning of prudent investing for directors of charities.  Id. 
104 Id. at § 3(a). 
105 Id. § 3(e)(1)(H). 
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3. The Prudent Investor Rule and Mission Investing 
¶33 Whether UPIA or UPMIFA applies, the prudent investor rule directs a charity to 
consider its charitable purposes in making investment decisions.
106
  Under the prudent 
investor rule, consideration of the charitable purposes may affect the time horizon for 
investments and the level of risk the charity should consider.  A charity may consider its 
purposes to select investments that may further those purposes.  Although a charity 
should not invest for vague social benefits unrelated to the charity‘s mission, an 
examination of investment options can include consideration of ways in which the 
investments can support the charity‘s mission. 
¶34 In making any investment decisions, judgment is critical.  The trustees or directors 
must think through complex issues involving the charity‘s mission and the best way to 
carry out that mission.  The trustees or directors may delegate the actual selection of 
investments to appropriate advisors, but the fiduciaries must set guidelines for investment 
advisors.
107
  In developing an investment policy for an organization, the fiduciaries must 
be careful to determine what strategies will best support their mission.  A determination 
of whether mission investing has a positive effect related to the charity‘s mission will 
likely be difficult because many variables affect that determination, and because the cause 
and effect of particular strategies may not be clear.
108
  The fiduciaries may determine that 
a mission-related investment strategy ―feels good‖ but does not benefit the mission.109  In 
that case, the charity might conclude that it should spend its time and effort to maximize 
profit and then use the profit for its mission.  If the fiduciaries conclude that mission 
investing will support the mission of the charity, they should establish a process that will 
result in competent decision-making about investments.
110
 
¶35 In addition to considering the charity‘s purpose, the investment decision maker 
must consider a number of economic factors.  A prudent investor will balance risk and 
return, trying to maximize overall return within the charity‘s level of risk tolerance.  If an 
investment has a below-market return or carries a high level of risk, the investment may 
not be prudent.  An important consideration in connection with mission investing will be 
the costs associated with investment options, not only in terms of each investment‘s fees 
and expenses, but also the amount of time the charity must spend to choose and monitor 
the investments.  Mission investing requires additional research by someone, and the cost 
of that research may result in additional fees for funds or time spent by investment 
managers working directly for the charity. 
¶36 The cost in the amount of staff time needed to engage in mission investing varies 
depending on the type of strategy used.  The efficacy of the strategies in carrying out a 
                                               
106 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 2(a), 2(c)(8) (1994); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL 
FUNDS ACT §§ 3(a), 3(e)(1)(H). 
107 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §9; UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 5. 
108 See SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 100–108 (discussing the problems a university 
may face). 
109 Professor Dobris has written about the ―psychic income‖ a beneficiary may receive in the private trust 
context, if the beneficiary supports socially responsible investing by the trustee.  See Dobris, supra note 11, 
at n. 27.  Psychic income does not apply in the charitable context because the ―beneficiary‖ is the charitable 
purpose and not an individual for whom the psychic income creates a benefit.  
110 See SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 87.  In developing a policy on socially responsible 
investing for Yale, these authors made the establishment of a ―process which will yield reasonably skillful 
and competent decisions‖ one of the investment principles.  Id. 
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charity‘s mission also varies.  Issues of cost and usefulness will be discussed in the 
following sections in connection with three types of socially responsible investment 
strategies: screens, shareholder advocacy, and community investment.
111
  The use of any 
of these strategies by a charity will depend on the charity‘s purposes and its ability to 
monitor the strategies. 
i) Screens 
¶37 Screens evaluate investments based on social or environmental criteria as well as 
financial performance.  Screens may be inclusionary or exclusionary.  An inclusionary 
screen helps identify companies in which to invest, while an exclusionary screen guides 
managers to avoid certain companies.  An inclusionary screen, for example, might guide a 
manager to invest in companies that engage in sustainable environmental practices and do 
not pollute, or companies that support employees through fair wages and benefits and 
nondiscriminatory policies.  An exclusionary screen might direct the manager not to 
invest in companies that produce tobacco or alcohol, that pollute, or that practice 
discriminatory employment practices.
112
  Seventy-five percent of screened funds use 
multiple screens, and a quarter of the funds screen on a single issue.
113
 
¶38 A determination of whether the use of screens in making investment decisions has 
any effect on the companies that are included or excluded is difficult.  Numerous 
variables affect company behavior, and if one charity chooses to invest in a company or 
to shun a company, the effect of that investment decision on the company may be 
impossible to know.  Determining the cost of a screen is easier, however, because the 
screened fund can be compared with a conventional fund to determine whether choosing 
the screened fund resulted in a lower return or in higher fees.  Some SRI funds have 
higher expenses and fees due to the additional research required,
114
 but not all SRI funds 
have higher costs.  For example, Vanguard‘s FTSE Social Index reports fees of 0.25 
percent.
115
  Some commentators have expressed concern that a screen will adversely 
affect return,
116
 but even in the early days of socially responsible investing, other 
                                               
111 In 2005, assets involved in socially responsible investing were identified as 68% in social screening 
only, 26% in shareholder advocacy, 5% in screening and shareholder advocacy, and 1% in community 
investing.  TRENDS, supra note 24, at Figure 1.1. 
112
 See, e.g., Noyes Investment Policy, supra note 36 (listing both inclusionary and exclusionary screens). 
113 TRENDS, supra note 24, at 8.  Note that an investment manager might identify the same companies using 
either an inclusionary or an exclusionary screen, but the emphasis of the two types of screens is somewhat 
different.  An inclusionary screen will identify companies that are particularly good at the sought-after 
behavior.  For example an environmental screen might look for companies with particularly strict pollution 
controls.  An exclusionary screen, in contrast, tells the investment manager that any company is acceptable 
from the standpoint of the screen as long as the company does not engage in the bad behavior that is the 
subject of the screen. 
114 See Shauna Croome-Carther, Funds with Values, FORBES.COM, Nov. 14, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/investoreducation/2007/11/14/sri-funds-domini-pf-education-
in_sc_1114investopedia_inl.html (noting that higher fees can be attributed to the costs of additional ethical 
research and that SRI funds tend to be managed by smaller companies and do not have the benefits of 
economies of scale). 
115 Penelope Wang, For Do-Good Funds, an Ethical Dilemma, CNNMONEY.COM, March 22, 2007,  
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/2007/04/01/8403607/index.htm. 
116 See Langbein & Posner, supra note 1, at 98–99. 
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observers thought that positive screens could yield financial benefits.
117
  More recently, a 
number of studies have shown that socially responsible portfolios using screens have 
returns comparable to those of conventional funds.
118
  In fact, some advocates of SRI now 
focus on the economic rather than the ethical benefits of SRI.
119
  
¶39 Data concerning the performance of SRI funds exist, but analysis of that data is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  As with many investment products, data may conflict 
and performance claims may be difficult to establish.  Further, good managers may 
improve results, while poor managers may cause lower returns.  Despite the limitations, 
one study is worth mentioning because the results are both interesting and surprising.  
¶40 An empirical study published in 2006 looked at the performance of companies 
rather than funds to provide additional data on the benefits and costs of socially 
responsible investing.
120
  The study found that companies with high scores on social 
responsibility characteristics such as diversity and employee relations outperformed 
companies with low ratings.
121
  Thus, positive screens resulted in financial benefits to the 
investors.  In contrast, companies typically screened out by socially responsible mutual 
funds, in particular tobacco, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, and nuclear companies, 
outperformed stocks in other industries.
122
  The study concluded that while other studies 
had found that socially responsible mutual funds performed at about the same level as 
conventional funds, those results occurred because the effects of the positive and negative 
screens cancelled each other out for the socially responsible funds.
123
  From the 
standpoint of financial returns, the best result would be to invest in socially responsible 
companies but not screen out ―sin‖ stocks and other companies typically shunned by SRI 
funds.
124
  Studies such as this one provide additional data for decision makers of charities. 
                                               
117 SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 137–38. 
118 Thompson, supra note 25; Statman & Glushkov, supra note 40, at 2–3 (citing four studies, from 1993, 
1999, 2000, and 2005, that showed ―no statistically significant difference between the returns of socially 
responsible mutual funds and those of conventional funds.‖); see also Solomon & Coe, supra note 32, at 
233–50 (discussing the performance record of socially responsible funds).  Jed Emerson also notes that 
―[i]mpact investing is not your parent‘s socially responsible investment strategy.‖  Jed Emerson, Steady 
Returns with Social Impact, FORBES, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/29/emerson-calvert-
sri-intelligent-investing-impact-investing.html (defining ―impact investing‖ as an investment strategy that 
considers social and environmental factors, and challenging the idea that social investment is ―a below-
market instrument where you need to assume you will have to take a hit on your financial returns to allow 
for some vague effort to ‗do good,‘‖ by pointing to, among other investments, ―various microfinance 
funds‖ which significantly outperformed many ―strictly commercial products‖ over the course of a year). 
119 Richardson, supra note 1, at 246 (‖[A] ―new style of SRI‖ [based] ―on the assumption that SRI will 
make investors prosperous rather than merely virtuous.‖).  However, in a 2009 discussion on SRI for 
private investors, Daniel Weiner, editor of Independent Adviser for Vanguard Investors, felt compelled to 
say, ―there is absolutely zero evidence that investors will see better performance using an SRI strategy.‖   
Michael Maiello, Mutual Funds: Is SRI Worth the Hassle?, FORBES, Aug. 21, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/20/sri-mutual-funds-intelligent-investing-ethics.html.  The shift from 
concern over taking reduced returns in order to engage in SRI to the idea that SRI might result in better 
returns is striking.  See id.  
120 Statman & Glushkov, supra note 40, at 3. 
121 Id. at 4. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See David K. Randall, Sin Stocks Outperform Over Time, Study Says, FORBES.COM, Oct. 21, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/21/sin-stocks-outperform-personal-finance-sin-stocks.html (describing a 
study that showed that tobacco, alcohol and gambling stocks outperformed other companies by 2.5% 
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¶41 Even if an investment that furthers a charity‘s mission produces a financial result 
that falls below what the charity might have expected from another investment, the 
decision to invest for mission may still be prudent.  A prudent investor considers the 
purposes of the charity in making investment decisions, and if an investment furthers 
those purposes, then a lower financial return may be acceptable.  A prudent investor 
should not invest solely for mission without regard for financial returns, but mission can 
be a factor to consider, along with the other factors related to economic conditions and 
performance.  It may be appropriate for the charity to consider part of the investment to 




¶42 The Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation (the Noyes Foundation) provides an example 
of a charity that ―views its investments as an integrated component of its overall 
mission.‖126  The Noyes Foundation has adopted an investment policy that stresses a 
combination of mission investing and generating returns to support its charitable 
mission.
127
  Its spending and investment goals include producing income and capital gains 
to support operations and grant-making; providing capital directly to enterprises that 
further the mission; maintaining ―the real (inflation adjusted) value of its assets over the 
long term;‖ owning equity or debt in companies that further its mission; and avoiding 
investments in ―companies whose environmental or social impacts contribute to the issues 
that the Foundation‘s grant-making seeks to address.‖128  This investment policy provides 
detailed guidelines for the investment managers, including benchmarks tied to 
performance standards.
129
  The Noyes Foundation has established market index 
benchmarks for each asset class and expects managers to meet or exceed these 
benchmarks.
130
  Thus, the investment policy makes clear the Noyes Foundation‘s 
expectation that its investments will not produce lower returns even though the 
investment choices also support its mission. 
¶43 In terms of how investments support its mission, the Noyes Foundation‘s 
investment policy identifies inclusionary and exclusionary screens related to four aspects 
of the Foundation‘s mission.131  The policy notes that to ―avail itself of a full spectrum of 
investment diversification,‖ the Foundation may invest in asset classes for which 
                                                                                                                                            
annually from 1926–2006, and suggested that because many investors, including universities and pension 
funds, shun these stocks, the demand and therefore the price is lower than it would otherwise be). 
125 A mission investment may be prudent even if the return for that investment is less than the charity might 
have otherwise received.  In a troubling statement on its website, Social Investment Forum considers the 
increasing amount of investment in SRI by ―major U.S. fiduciaries‖ evidence that ―SRI strategies do not 
impede financial returns‖ because ―fiduciaries are obligated by law to seek competitive returns for the 
portfolios they manage.‖  See Performance and Socially Responsible Investments, SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
FORUM, http://www.socialinvest.org/resources/performance.cfm. 
126 Noyes Investment Policy, supra note 36. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  Indices include the Domini 400 Social Index, S&P 500 Index, Russell 2000 Value Index, and 
Lehman Bros. Aggregate Bond Index.  Id. 
131 Id. (listing four broad categories for screens: toxic emissions, extractive industries, and environmental 
justice; sustainable agricultural and food systems; reproductive health and rights; a sustainable and socially 
just society).  The Noyes Foundation also employs proxy voting.  Id. 





  For example, hedge funds, venture capital, and real estate 
may be an appropriate part of a diversified portfolio, but screening may not be feasible.
133
  
The Noyes Foundation reviews manager performance on a quarterly basis, and that 
review includes comparison of the Foundation‘s screened portfolio with other screened 
and unscreened portfolios, including the benchmarks for each asset class; adherence to 
the screens and values of the Foundation; interactions with companies in the portfolio 
through shareholder activities or otherwise; transaction costs; and portfolio balancing 
among the managers.
134
  At least once every three years, the Noyes Foundation also 
reviews the relationship between its financial returns and the impact of screening.
135
  The 
Foundation‘s website does not disclose the findings in those reviews, but the fact that the 
Noyes Foundation continues to use the screens as part of its investment strategy suggests 
satisfaction with the returns obtained. 
¶44 The Noyes Foundation appears to be operating as a prudent investor with respect to 
its funds, managing them for both return and mission.  The website does not provide 
information on actual investment performance, but if the Noyes Foundation follows the 
rigorous review process outlined in the investment policy, underperforming funds or 
managers are likely to be quickly replaced. 
ii) Shareholder Advocacy—Proxy Voting 
¶45 Some charities use their position as shareholders to try to influence corporate 
behavior.
136
  Shareholder resolutions on social, environmental, and corporate governance 
issues have increased over the past few years.
137
  A group of shareholders may use a 
shareholder resolution to try to change a company‘s behavior, even though the financial 
returns to shareholders have been acceptable.  Even if a particular resolution fails to pass, 
the resolution puts the managers and directors on notice about the priorities and concerns 
of at least some of the company‘s shareholders.  Shareholders may also engage in 
ongoing dialogue with management, sometimes as a lead-up to filing a shareholder 
resolution and sometimes as an alternative to filing shareholder resolutions.
138
  
¶46 The Noyes Foundation‘s investment policy promotes shareholder advocacy as part 
of its mission investing and provides directions on how the Foundation should use its 
―voice.‖139  The investment policy states that if a proxy involves program interests, the 
                                               
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  The investment policy contains detailed rules for putting a fund on ―watch‖ status and terminating a 
fund if the Finance Committee loses confidence in the fund‘s management.  Id. 
135 Id. 
136 A fiduciary holding shares as assets for a charity has a fiduciary duty to vote the shares.  UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 802(g) (2005); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF 
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(b) (2006).  Any resolution can have an impact on the company, and 
increasingly resolutions that address social and environmental issues appear on the ballot for proxy voting.  
All investors in the company will be confronted with the resolution, so a charity that can help get a 
resolution on the ballot may gain support for its issue more broadly.  TRENDS, supra note 24, at 16–27. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 18–19 (describing dialogue as a shareholder tool and also describing dialogue between fund 
managers and management as a means to promote corporate social responsibility). 
139 Noyes Investment Policy, supra note 36. 
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Foundation will vote in a manner consistent with those interests.
140
  When a shareholder 
issue involves social or environmental matters not directly related to program interests, 
the Foundation ―will review each individual case and consult with [its] grantees, 
managers and others, as appropriate.‖141  The investment policy provides guidelines for 
voting on issues of corporate governance.
142
  In some cases, the Foundation may hold 
shares in a company that is incompatible with the Foundation‘s mission and use its 
position as a shareholder to address its concerns.
143
 
¶47 Socially responsible funds may use the weight of many investors, both charities and 
private investors, to influence corporate behavior.  In 2002, the socially responsible 
investing fund Domini
144
 led a coalition of investors holding 500,000 shares of stock in 
Procter & Gamble.
145
  The shareholders urged Procter & Gamble to offer Fair Trade 
Certified coffee
146
 and eventually filed a related shareholder resolution.
147
  In 2003, 
Procter & Gamble announced that it would begin marketing Fair Trade Certified coffee 
products.
148
  Other factors, including pressure from consumers and humanitarian 
organizations, influenced Procter & Gamble, but the shareholder action played a role in 
the company‘s decision.149 
¶48 Shareholder advocacy requires more active involvement by charities owning stock 
in the companies than does investing with screens, but a charity with the resources to 
devote to shareholder advocacy may find it an effective way to support the organization‘s 
mission,
150
 and the connection between mission and investment may be more significant.  
Given the increased cost in time, when deciding whether to engage in shareholder 
advocacy, the charity must consider whether the time could be better spent on other 
mission-related activities.
151
  Clearly, a decision to engage in this sort of mission 
investing requires a careful exercise of judgment by the charity‘s decision makers. 





144 Domini Social Investments integrates social and environmental criteria into investment decisions for the 
funds it manages.  Welcome to Domini Social Investments, DOMINI SOC. INVESTMENTS,  
http://www.domini.com/about-domini/index.htm.  Domini develops and applies social and environmental 
standards for the funds and Wellington Management is responsible for financial standards and portfolio 
construction for the funds.  Id.  In 2008 Domini filed 19 shareholder resolutions.  William Donovan, Full 
Contact Investing, ABOUT.COM: SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING,  
http://socialinvesting.about.com/od/srishareholders/a/socialactivism.htm. 
145 Press Release, Global Exchange, Advocacy Groups and Shareholders Persuade Procter and Gamble, 
GLOBAL EXCH. (Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.globalexchange.org/update/press/1043.html.  Domini worked 
with the Center for Reflection, Education and Action (CREA), a research, education, and action 
organization.  Id. 
146 Fair Trade certification requires a minimum level of compensation for small coffee farmers, a level 




150 See Dobris, supra note 11, at 777 (suggesting that proxy voting and shareholder motions may be more 
effective than screens in changing corporate behavior). 
151 See, e.g., SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, supra note 3, at 86 (detailing the various considerations that 
a university must take into account). 
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iii) Community Investing 
¶49 Community investing typically uses capital from investors and lends it to people or 
businesses in underserved communities.
152
  Through community investing, funds can be 
made available to low-income individuals, small businesses, and organizations providing 
services such as affordable housing.  A charity may engage directly in community 
investing or may invest through a local organization that provides the financial services.  
¶50 Many micro-finance organizations operate internationally.  For example, the 
Grameen Foundation provides capital to micro-lenders in poor communities around the 
world so that they can make small loans to individuals, mostly women, to start 
businesses.
153
  The Foundation uses several strategies to make repayments likely, and, as 
loans are repaid, uses the funds to make new loans.
154
  Other financial services 
organizations operate in the United States.  Community development banks and 
community development credit unions lend money in underserved communities to 
individuals who might not have access to conventional financial services.
155
  For 
example, Bethex Federal Credit Union provides financial services to low income families 
in the Bronx.
156
  Organized in 1970 to help ―welfare mothers‖ who solved their cash 
emergencies by using a pawnshop or loan shark, the credit union now has assets of $16 
million.
157
  Members‘ accounts provide some of the funds available for lending, and low-
interest or no-interest deposits from banks and foundations enlarge the lending pool.
158
 
After Hurricane Katrina devastated parts of New Orleans, the Hope Community Credit 
Union helped local residents obtain loans for businesses and home repairs.
159
  These 
community credit unions provide financial services to low income people who might not 
otherwise be able to obtain loans and other services.
160
 
¶51 Trinity College, in Hartford, Connecticut, provides a good example of direct 
community investing.  By the 1990s, the area around Trinity College had become 
depressed and unsafe.
161
  The College bought properties adjacent to its own property, 
fixed up the properties, and then sold them to homeowners and businesses.
162
  Trinity did 
not intend to use the properties directly for college purposes, but did anticipate that 
revitalizing the area near the campus would result in benefits for the college community 
                                               
152 TRENDS, supra note 24, at 28–29. 
153 What We Do, GRAMEEN FOUND., http://www.grameenfoundation.org/what_we_do. 
154
 See id; see Microfinance Basics, GRAMEEN FOUNDATION, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/what-we-
do/microfinance/microfinance-basics. 
155 TRENDS, supra note 24, at 29–30. 
156 About Us, BETHEX FED. CREDIT UNION, http://bethexfcu.org/about.htm. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 See Tracy Fernandez Rysavy & Prianjali Mascarenhas, Financing Hope, YES!,  
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/go-local/financing-hope. 
160 About Us, NAT‘L FED‘N OF COMMUNITY DEV. CREDIT UNIONS,  
http://www.cdcu.coop/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=256#About_our_members. 
161 See Eric Goldscheider, College Initiates Program to Give Back to Its Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2000, at B15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/01/nyregion/college-initiates-program-to-give-
back-to-its-neighbors.html. 
162 See Jane Gross, Trinity College Leads Effort to Spark Hartford’s Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, 
at A1, available at  
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E07EFDF163FF937A25757C0A961958260. 
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and would likely increase student applications.
163
  Viewed entirely from an investment 
perspective, the acquisitions would likely not have been prudent.
164
  In contrast, as assets 
that provided both a degree of investment potential and benefits for the purposes of the 
college, the purchases made sense.
165
 
¶52 The impact of community investing continues to grow.  For many of the charities 
that engage in this type of investing, the investing may be such a significant part of the 
charity‘s mission that the investments may properly be considered program-related assets.  
The rules of prudence apply, but the concerns about financial return will differ from the 
analysis applied to other types of mission investing. 
III. JEOPARDIZING INVESTMENTS—IRC § 4944 
¶53 The Internal Revenue Code provides one other legal rule that applies to investment 
decision-making by charities, although it applies only to private foundations.
166
  Section 
4944 prohibits private foundations from investing in investments that jeopardize a private 
foundation‘s charitable purposes.167  Congress enacted § 4944 as part of a group of code 
sections, termed the private foundation rules, added to the Internal Revenue Code in 
1969.
168
  Prior to 1969, Congress became concerned that foundations created and 
managed by an individual or a family were at risk of possible abuse by those individuals 
or family members.
169
  The private foundation rules represented an attempt to curtail 
these abuses, with a particular focus on self-dealing and business holdings in donor-
owned companies.
170
  The rule regarding jeopardizing investments has been described as 
―[a] minor proposal to control trading and speculation, which the Treasury found only 
among a small group of foundations.‖171 
¶54 Section 4944 exempts from its coverage investments that qualify as program-
related investments.
172
  If a foundation makes an investment to accomplish a charitable 
purpose of the foundation, and if the production of income is not a ―significant purpose,‖ 
                                               
163 Gitta Morris, How Trinity Aims to Stay Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996, at CN1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/18/nyregion/how-trinity-aims-to-stay-competitive.html; see Stacey 
Stowe, Raising the Neighborhood: A Few Years Into Its Ambitious Plan, Trinity College Sees Results, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at CT1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/29/nyregion/raising-
neighborhood-few-years-into-its-ambitious-plan-trinity-college-sees.html (indicating applications to Trinity 
have increased seventy-seven percent). 
164 Goldscheider, supra note 161. 
165 Id.  The investments Trinity College made could be viewed as program-related investments.  Whether 
considered program-related investments or mission investments, the investments served a purpose related 
to the mission of the college and were carried out in a prudent manner. 
166 The IRC creates two categories of charities: public charities (those that meet the requirements of § 509) 
and private foundations (all other charities).  I.R.C. § 509 (2006).  In general (and superficially) private 
foundations typically have one or very few donors and do not receive support from the general public.  Id.  
167 § 4944(a)(2). 
168 See Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on Its Origins and 
Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52 (2000). 
169 Congressman Wright Patman led a campaign against foundation abuse.  WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE 
BIG FOUNDATIONS 7 (1972); see also Troyer, supra note 168 at 63. 
170 Troyer, supra note 168, at 57. 
171 Id. at 58. 
172 I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006); see supra Section I.A. 
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the asset will not be subject to § 4944.
173
  Thus, § 4944 applies to mission investing 
because, by definition, a charity uses mission investing to generate investment returns as 
well as to carry out charitable purposes.  Section 4944 meshes with the prudent investor 
rules already discussed.
174
  An investment decision maker must weigh economic factors 
when engaging in mission investing and if the decision maker does so and then makes 
prudent investment decisions, § 4944 should not impose a penalty on the charity or the 
manager. 
IV. DONORS 
¶55 Although not directly related to the fiduciary‘s duties with respect to a charity, 
donors may play a role in connection with a charity‘s investments.  Donors can, in a gift 
agreement entered into with a charity, provide directions about how a charity should 
invest the donated funds.
175
  For example, a donor concerned with risk could direct a 
charity to invest only in financial instruments backed by the U.S. government.  The 
charity could decide whether to accept such a restriction and might decline the gift on 
those terms.  A donor might also direct the charity to engage in a particular form of 
mission investing.  For example, a donor could require that a charity dedicated to 
improving health not invest in tobacco stocks.
176
  Again, the charity would decide 
whether to accept the gift with the restriction.  Finally, a donor might increase the 
fiduciary‘s discretion with respect to investment decision-making, perhaps in order to 
make relationship to mission a more important factor to consider. 
¶56 Donors will probably not object to a charity‘s decision to engage in mission 
investing, as long as the decision makers continue to act as prudent investors.  Some 
donors may even assume that a charity will make investment decisions that further the 
charity‘s mission, or at least do not undercut the mission.  For example, a donor to a 
charity organized to promote sustainable forestry might be distressed to learn that the 
charity invested in a traditionally run timber company, unless the charity planned to use 
shareholder advocacy to change logging practices.  If donors expect mission investing, 
then donor expectations may push charities to engage in more mission investing.  
Charities may be able to use mission investing to attract new donors, but a charity must 
                                               
173 § 4944(c) (defining program-related investment). 
174 The regulations under § 4944 make clear that a foundation manager can avoid making jeopardizing 
investments by acting as a prudent investor.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2).  The regulations describe the 
type of prudence a prudent investor would exercise, without using the term ―prudent investor.‖ 
175 Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing the Right 
Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 995 (2010). 
176 Jeffrey Cooper has suggested that, under the Uniform Trust Code, a settlor of a trust could not place a 
negative restriction on a trustee‘s ability to invest in companies the settlor found repugnant, for example 
cigarette manufacturers.  Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, The Uniform Trust Code, 
and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1193–94 (2008).  Although the UTC 
codifies the longstanding trust law rule against capricious purposes, now termed the benefit-the-
beneficiaries rule, the rule prevents settlors only from placing restrictions on investment decision-making 
that would override the duty to act as a prudent investor so completely that the beneficiary would lose 
significant benefits from the trust.  John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the 
Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 397 (2010) (―The settlor who is forbidden to 
direct the trustee to burn the Rembrandt is still allowed to impose any investment or administrative regime 
that does not offend outer limits of rationality.‖).  People may argue about the prudence of a screen for 
tobacco stocks, but that sort of restriction is not so harmful as to be prohibited by the UTC. 
Vol. 6:1] Susan N. Gary 
129 
be careful not to antagonize donors by investing imprudently, either by engaging in 
socially responsible investing that is not related to the charity‘s mission or by incurring 
costs that are not outweighed by mission-related benefits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶57 Little case law exists that addresses investment decision-making by managers of 
charities.
177
  Thus, the statutes on prudent investing and the Restatements of Trusts 
remain the best sources of legal guidance.  Neither UPIA nor UPMIFA discusses mission 
investing directly, but an analysis of those statutes suggests that the law permits mission 
investing by charities.  Descriptions of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence in the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts support this view, and a comment to the general standard of 
prudent investment agrees with this interpretation of the law.
178
 
¶58 Trustees and directors of charities should understand the legal rules that apply to 
investment decision-making by a fiduciary.  Private investors can choose to engage in 
socially responsible investing with their own funds, but a fiduciary must act in the best 
interests or sole interests of the charity, without letting personal interests dictate decision-
making.  A fiduciary must exercise judgment carefully, and issues involved in mission 
investing can be complex.  As long as a fiduciary acts as a prudent investor, however, the 
fiduciary may consider the charity‘s mission among the other factors that apply to prudent 
investing.  The fiduciary should consider the efficacy of an investment in relation to the 
charity‘s mission and also the costs incurred in connection with the investment, while 
keeping in mind that investments may support the charitable mission in non-financial as 
well as financial ways.  A fiduciary acting on behalf of a charity has significant discretion 
in making investment decisions.  So long as the fiduciary exercises judgment with due 
regard to the factors a prudent investor should consider, the fiduciary will be in 
compliance with the applicable legal duties.  The fiduciary can choose to include mission 
investing as part of the charity‘s investment strategy. 
                                               
177 See Dobris, supra note 11, at 773–774 (noting that very little litigation about SRI exists and suggesting 
that a case with a sympathetic trustee could provide ―more flexibility in regard to SRI‖). 
178 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (2007). 
